00086

c. 1969/10/28

Truth

Oct '68
Legislative Leaders

I can't ask ~~the~~ American people ~~must~~ ~~can't be~~ asked for support of war - our policy for years unless they know the truth.
(They are entitled to know the truth)

without knowing the facts

~~to~~ answer question which troubles America.
① ~~Why did~~ U.S.
② ~~Why did we~~
① How + why did U.S. get involved in V. Nam in first place
② ~~How~~ How has the Adm changed our policy -
③ What has happened in Negotiations - our both past - & in V. Nam -
④ What are our choices now
⑤ What the prospects -

~~This will be the~~
① I shall give you the facts as they are
② ~~I can't~~ ask for support + unless the people know the truth -
① What we have done diplomatically -
② What we have done militarily -

Every prepaid teacher might

~~1. [illegible]~~

~~2. [illegible]~~

~~3. [illegible]~~

~~4. [illegible]~~

~~5. [illegible]~~

~~6. [illegible]~~

~~7. [illegible]~~

~~8. [illegible]~~

~~9. [illegible]~~

~~10. [illegible]~~

~~11. [illegible]~~

~~12. [illegible]~~

~~13. [illegible]~~

~~14. [illegible]~~

~~15. [illegible]~~

~~16. [illegible]~~

~~17. [illegible]~~

~~18. [illegible]~~

~~19. [illegible]~~

~~20. [illegible]~~

This plan is part of a major shift in U.S. foreign policy which I described in Guam — on —.

① We Americans are a do it yourself people — an impatient people — We don't like to see someone else do a job we do it ourselves —

② This trait has been carried over in our foreign policy. In Korea — we finished the war & many think that we should have defeated them — to help the defeated there —

③ Before a single American was committed to Viet Nam — gave this advice — Help them fight the war but don't fight the war for them —

④ We Americanized the war — (realizing this) — it resulted in Asians counting not to step on them to defend selves in their own land — We are Vietnamizing the war —

The Defense of freedom is everybody's business — not just America's business.

It is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened.

The results are now becoming evident — after 5 years of war — 60,000 out

Enemy infiltration is ½ of last year —

Most important committee down — to lowest point in 3 years —

① During month of last year — they

The withdrawal has been from strength & not from weakness —

We have a plan for withdrawal & replacement — apart from Negotiations —

— level of fighting, struggle of S. V. Nam —

2 do not announce a timetable —

① It will depend on development —

② amount in withdrawal — given advantage to enemy —

The sum total of all the public, private, + secret visits negotiations which have been undertaken since the Bombing Halt a year ago - + since this Admin came into Office on Jan 20 - is no progress whatever - except agreement on the shape of the table.

This is discouraging + disappointing but the American people are entitled to the truth the good news + bad news as well as the good -

Now let me turn to a more encouraging report -

At the same time we launched our diplomatic search for peace through negotiation - we recognized negotiation might not succeed. We therefore adopted another path at the same time - effort another plan - one to bring pressure - a plan which will succeed in bring the war to an end regardless of whether or not we succeed in negotiations - It will take longer -

The plan is called Vietnamization:

It is based on a sound premise
~~which the plan we started on~~
① When we came in - S.V.
The S. Vietnamese
~~Wherever we~~ stepped up
Under the plan - we train + equip S. V. Forces to defend their own country -
~~At the same~~ ② At the same time
~~after you~~ we began withdrawing + replacing with S. V. Forces.
We increase + expand our orders -
We reduced the

~~2. As far as the other two factors are~~

2

As I have indicated ~~a~~ several ~~times~~ as ~~I have~~ the Rate of Withdrawal will depend on ~~3 factors~~ developments on 3 fronts:

1. ~~The~~ One is the progress which may be made at the Paris ~~negotiations~~ talks.
   a. Any announcement of a timetable would completely remove an incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement.
      (1) They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn - and then move in

@

2. The other two factors on which we will base our ~~withdrawal~~ withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity + the progress of the training program of the South Vietnam forces.
   a. If Progress on both these fronts has been greater we anticipated when we started the withdrawal program in June -
   b. As a result our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than ~~it was~~ when we ~~started~~ made our first estimates in June.
   ~~c. It only makes good sense to keep the timetable on.~~
   c. To be frozen in a ~~a~~ fixed timetable would not give us the flexibility ~~to~~ to base each

we need to base each

withdrawal decision on the situation as

it is at ~~the time it develops~~. as it is at that time

rather than on estimates that are no longer valid.

In all candor I must leave one note of caution.

① If ~~the enemy~~ the level of enemy activity

significantly increases we might have

~~to reassess~~ to adjust our timetable accordingly.

② However ~~I have said~~ let the record be clear

on ~~on what occurs~~ this one point.

Should increase